I 



THE EEAL CHICKAIATJ&A. 



J^EPRINT OF ARTICLES BY W. S. FURAY, WAR CORRE- 
SPONDENT CINCINNATI GAZETTE, AND COL. G. C. 
KNIFFIN, CHIEF COMMISSARY TWENTY. FIRST 
CORPS, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



(W. S. FuRAY in Columbus State Journal, September, 1888) 

ORIGINAL WAR SKETCHES. 



THE REAL CHIOKAMAUGA. 



We are rapidly approaching the anniversary of one of the 
Tuost imj'ortant battles of the war ; many of its survivors are 
•still in tie city ; and before some of them reach their homes 
tiiat anniversary will have rolled around. 

On September 19 and 20, 1863, was fought the awful bat- 
tle of Chickaniauga, in many respects the weirdest, wildest, 
fiercest conflict of all tbose that took place between the Na- 
tional and the Confederate armies. It was in the West as 
decisive in its way as Gettysburg in the East. If the latter 
put an end forever to the Confederate dream of Northern in- 
vasion, conquest, and plunder, the former extinguished the 
last rebel hope of overthrowing and destroying the Union 
-army which in the central West was being driven into the 
very heart of the Confederacy, and which threatened it as 
vitally as poised spear held in stalwart liand ever threatened 
the life of an individual. Nashville, Vicksburg, New 
Orleans, Charleston, Knoxville, Williamsburg, were but 
outposts of the Confederate power. The successive fall of 
each marked an encouraging progress of the national arms 
but affected only incidentally and minutely the general 
result. The possession of neither of them either touched or 



/fa 



£-f75 
SI 

menaced a vital point. Even Richraond was but an outpost 
until the success of the Union armies in the center of the 
Confederacy left the legions of Lee once expelled from Rich- 
mond literally nowhere else to go. The campaign of Chicka- 
mauga was directed against a city which was the very key to 
the interior of the Confederacy, the crossing point of its 
greatest lines of railroad from all directions, the citidal of 
Georgia and the whole interior South. So long as Chat- 
tanooga remained in Confederate hands the enemy's power 
was practically unbroken, the great slave empire untouched. 

General Loring, one of the most sagacious of all the offi- 
cers that wore the gray, said to the writer of this article, 
near the close of the war and before he had heard of the sur- 
render at Appomattox: "Our cause is probably lost, but 
your temporary victories up to the latter part of 1863 had 
little to do with it. Not a man in the Southern Confederacy 
felt that you had really accomplished anything until Chat- 
tanooga fell." 

" You do not mean to say, general, that Vicksburg and 
Gettysburg Avere nothing." 

" The loss of Vicksburg," he replied, " weakened our 
prestige, contracted our territory, and practically expelled us 
from the Mississippi River, but it left the body of our power 
unharmed. As to Gettysburg, that was an experiment ; if 
we had won that battle the government at Washington 
would, perhaps, have tendered peace with a recognition of 
the Confederacy. Our loss of it, except that we could less 
easily spare the slaughter of veteran soldiers than you could, 
left us just where we were." 

" But in the latter part of 1863 some of your people lost 
hope?" I asked. 

" Not exactly that," said he, " but they experienced then 
for the first time a diminution of confidence as to the final 
result." 

"And may T ask what it was that occurred then which 
occasioned this change of feeling?" 

"It was the fall of Chattanooga," he replied, "in conse- 
quence of the Chickamauga campaign, and the subsequent 
total defeat of General Bragg's efforts to recover it." 

" Why did you regard Chattanooga as of such impor- 
tance ?" I asked. 

"As long as we held it," he replied, "it was the closed 
doorway to the interior of our country. When it came into- 
your hands the door stood open, and however rough your 
progress in the interior might be, it still left you free ta 



march inside. I tell you," continued he, with a vehemence 
which, in so modest and quiet a gentleman, greatly im- 
pressed me, " that when your Dutch General Rosecrans 
commenced his forward movement tor the capture of Chat- 
tanooga we laughed him to scorn ; we believed that the 
black brow of Lookout Mountain would irown him out of 
existence ; that he would dash himself to pieces against the 
many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chat- 
tanooga ; and that then the Northern people and the gov- 
ernment at Washington would perceive how hopeless were 
their efforts when they came to attack the real South." 

" But the capture of Chattanooga convinced you that even 
the real South was vulnerable, did it? " 

"Yes," said he, '*it was then only a question as to 
whether we could beat back your armies by sheer force of 
desperate fighting, and as you largely outnumbered us and 
our resources were every day diminishing, the prospects to 
the thinking part of our people looked gloomy indeed." 

" But, general," I said, "there are people in the North 
who regard the Chickamauga campaign as a failure for the 
Union arms." 

" Ah ! " he replied, "we would gladly have exchanged a 
dczen of our previous victories for that one failure." 

This conversation took place in the month of April, 1865, 
on board a steamer bound to New Orleans, the day after the 
battle of Blakely, in which G-eneral Loring commanded the 
Confederate forces, and he and his entire force that survived 
the battle, rank and file, were made prisoners by the Union 
Army under General Can by. I had approached the distin- 
guished prisoner, who, by the way, with a comparatively 
mere handful of men, had bravely held the approaches to 
Mobile against us for a good many days, had introduced my- 
self as war correspondent of one ol the leading journals of the 
North, and had asked him to give me tlie exact relative posi- 
tion of the different bodies of troops under his command in 
the battle of the previous day. This he very courteously 
did, and authorized me to make use ot the information in the 
account of the battle which 1 was preparing while hastening 
northward to the home office. 

Then I gave him the latest information I possessed as to 
the progress being made by Grant in Virginia and of the ad- 
vance of Sherman through the Carolinas toward Richmond. 
It was upon this that he made the first remark in the conver- 
sation 1 have just detailed, and in which I mentally noted 
every word he said with an absorbing interest which the 
reader will readily understand. 



Half an hour afterward I was seated flat on my haunches 
on the deck of the steamer, writing for dear life, when Gen- 
eral Loring approached and accosted me. 

"What are you writing now?" he inquired. 

He had been so courteous under adverse circumstances to 
me, that I felt I could not be otherwise than entirely frank 
with hira. 

"I am writing out your remarks concerning the eflfect of 
the Chickamauga campaign," said I, "every word of which 
1 well remember." 

"It struck me," said he, "that you might be doing that. 
But I think you will see that the publication of those remarks 
while the war continues might be seriously misunderstood by 
my compatriots in arms, and might subject me to heavy cens- 
ure. I did not intend them for publication, and regarded 
tliem as part of a private conversation we were having after 
the public portion was closed. I cannot take back the re- 
marks now, and I have no power to prevent you from print- 
ing them. I can only ask you as a gentleman to withhold 
them from publication until the war is over." 

It was a hard request to comply with. If the struggle 
were to go on, General Loring's views would make a sensa- 
tion, and be a great encouragement to the loyal people of the 
land. I felt that in printing them I should make a big hit 
both as a journalist and a patriot. But with that courteous, 
sad-eyed, mild-mannered, and unfortunate gentleman stand- 
ing over me, helpless as a prisoner of war who had given 
me his confidence, there was only one thing to do. 

" Your wishes shall be respected, general," said I. "I 
.sliall finish my notes while our talk is fresh in my mind; but 
they will never see the light until I feel sure that their pub- 
lication will discredit you with no one." 

" Thank you," said he; " however the war may end, print 
what I said if you choose, and if you think it worth printing 
any time after the conflict is closed." 

More than twenty-three years the notes of that conversa- 
tion have remained in my hands, and the}'^ see the light for 
the first time to-day. 1 should probably never have given 
them to the press if the whole American people had done 
immediate justice to the noble Army of the Cumberland, 
which took and held Chattanooga at the awful cost of Chick- 
amauga, and had given to the great soldier who led our 
army in that struggle the credit which his ability, his genius, 
his patriotism, his heroism, and his success demand. But 
strange, sad, and terrible as it may seem, a portion of our 



people — I trust tlie nninber is small indeed — have persist- 
ently misunderstood the vast achievement which Rosecrans 
and the Army of the Cumberland accomplished during the 
Chickamauga campaign. Envy, jealousy, and malice threw 
a clnid over the achievement in the first place, took from 
Rosecrans the palm which justly belonged to him, and sent 
an order relieving him of command — an order that reached 
him while in that very citadel of Chattanooga, that vital 
point of the Southern Confederacy which his genius and the 
valor of his soldiers had wrested from the enemy's hands. 
It was the same malice, jealousy, and envy which afterward 
cast their evil eyes upon the great Thomas, and tried to re- 
lieve him also while he was literally annihilating the last 
Confederate army in the West. And so it has happened 
that a small portion of the American people have ever since 
labored under the cruelly false conception that in some way 
the campaign of Chickamauga was a failure, and that Rose- 
crans, who never lost a battle during his entire career, Aad 
in some way fallen short of the requirements of able general- 
ship. 

It is with the hope of contributing my mite toward remov- 
ing this false impression that I have concluded to give this 
long-past conversation with General Loring to the public. 
It shows, as perhaps nothing else could so conclusively show, 
the impression made upon the Confederate mind by the bat- 
tle of Chickamauga and the fall of Chattanooga. It shows 
that they knew what and who hurt them, even if we didn't 
know. I am all the more anxious to add my humble effort 
to those of others in doing full justice to " Old Rosey" and 
his gallant army, because I myself, writing' more than twenty - 
five years ago an account of the battle of Chickamauga from 
notes that were taken amidst the very flame and thunder of 
that awful field, exaggerated somewhat the losses of the 
Union forces, and failed to give full credit to the all-know- 
ing soldier who was able to look at all the aspects of the 
field, and after partial misfortune to build up a barrier which 
the enemy next day did not dare assail. I wrote even then 
with what seems to me a boundless appreciation of the valor 
of our army, but I failed duly to appreciate the fact that the 
prize for which the battle was fought, the city of Chatta- 
nooga, remained in our hands, making the whole campaign 
a wondrous triumph of genius, patience, strategy, energy, 
and skill, and the battle itself a victory decisive as that which 
compelled Lee to abandon Richmond. 



6 

OJd soldiers of the Array of the Cumberland ! Let no one 
go unrebuked who denies your vast success in the campaign 
of Chickamauga. It was there that your valor and the gen- 
eralship of your great commander loosened the foundations 
of the rebel confederacy and opened the door of the structure; 
and although awful work still remained in pulling that struct- 
ure down, its fate, in the opinion of the most thoughtful 
Confederates themselves, was definitely sealed when Chicka- 
mauga gave you Chattanooga, and when, on the afternoon of 
September 21, General Bragg, advancing cautiously to view 
your new lines at Rossville, did not dare assail them. 

W. S. FURAY. 



[Cincinnati C )mmercial Gazette, Sept. 8, 1888.] 

ON THE TENNESSEE. 



ADDITIONAL FACTS ABOUT ROSECRANS STRATEGIC MOVEMENTS IN 
TENNESSEE — WHY BURNSIDB FAILED TO EXECUTE HIS ORDERS TO 
JOIN "ROSEY" — PRESIDENT LINCOLN APPRECIATES THE SITUA- 
TION — HIS ORDER TO BURNSIDE A MASTERLY, IMPARTIAL REVIEW 

OF THE TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

Washington, August 2, 1888. 
To the Editor of the Commercial Gazette : 

1 have just finished reading General Boynton's vivid de- 
scription of General Rosecrans's unparalleled strategic move- 
ment upon Chattanooga and its attendant battle of Chicka- 
manga, and am more than impressed with a sense ot" the 
injustice inflicted upon him by tlie War Department. 

Although the subject has been treated with such thorough- 
ness as to leave nothing to add as regards the operations of 
the Army of the Cumberland, the failure of the Army of the 
Ohio to re-enforce General Rosecrans is a theme which may 
interest the student of the joint campaigns made by those 
armies. I leave to the Army of the Tennessee, the survivors 
of which have usually proved themselves equal to any emer- 
gency, to explain the inactivity of that army at a time when 
the appearance of even one corps at Rome, Ga., would have 
held back re-enforcements to Bragg's army from the South. 

General Boynton says : " There had been time enough, 
after General Rosecrans's explanation of his proposed })lan, 
to force Burnside with twenty thousand men down from East 
Tennessee, and to have brought all needed strength for the 
other flank from the Army of the Tennessee on the Missis- 
sippi." 

Leaving to others to rise and explain why one hundred 
tliousand men were permitted to be idle on the banks of the 
Mississippi while the Army of the Cumberland was engaged 
in a death grapple on Chickaraauga Creek, not only with its 
old antagonist, but with Confederate troops withdrawn from 
the front of both Meade and Grant, I shall ask the atten- 
tion of your readers while 1 quote from the record the dis- 
patches that passed to and fro between the commander of 
the U. S. Army and his subordinates in command of the 
Army of the Ohio. 



Weighed in the balance of common justice, at this distance^ 
from the scene of conflict, with all the strife, jealousy, and 
political enmity thrown out of the scales, it seems incredible 
that the commander of the array who won not only the ob- 
jective point of his own campaign, but of the fruitless cam- 
paigns of his predecessor, was dishonored by his Government, 
.while the commander of the other army in the joint cam- 
paign, who, by persistent disobedience of orders, placed in 
jeopardy the success of the expedition, was loaded with hon- 
ors by the same Government. 

The East Tennessee camgaign of August and September,. 
1863, under the light of the record, embraces not only the 
movements of General Rosecraus, but to an equal extent 
those of General Burnside. The Army of the Ohio on duty 
in Kentucky consisted of the Ninth Corps, commanded by 
Major-General J. D. Park, and the Twenty-third Corps, un- 
der command of Major-General George L. Hartsuif. The 
first of these corps numbered, on August 30, " present for 
duty, equipped, 5,965 ; artillery. 208 ; total, 6,173. The 
Twenty-third Corps, composed of three divisions, numbered, 
infantry, 14,279; cavalry, 6,073; artillery, 1,468; total, 
21,814. The first division of this corps, under command of 
General Boyle, 6,357 men of all arms, was required for duty 
in guarding various military posts in Kentucky, leaving the- 
remainder, 15,457, for offensive operations. The total effect- 
ive strength of both corps was 21,630. The advance into* 
East Tennessee commenced August 20. General Hascall's 
division moved from Crab Orchard, crossing the Cumberland 
at Smith's Ford ; General White's division crossed at James- 
town, the cavalry and mounted infantry, Generals Carter 
and Shackelford and Colonels Foster and Wolford, moving in 
advance of each column. 

The two columns were ordered to concentrate after cross- 
ing the Cumberland Mountains near Huntsville, and move 
upon Montgomery, in East Tennessee. From there the move- 
ments, as Burnside telegraphed Halleck, would be " accord- 
ing to circumstances, but probably upon Kingston and Lou- 
don, as these seem to be the places to which General Rosecrans 
desires us to go, in order to co-operate fully ivith him. At all 
events, our final destination will be Knoxville. We have 
had very serious difficulty to contend with in bad roads and 
short forage ; in fact, the country is about destitute. V/e 
shall have still greater difficulties in that way to overcome, 
but if Rosecrans occupies the enemy fully and no troops are al- 
lowed to come down the road from Richmond from the East- 



9 

ern army, I think we will be successful." The army arrived 
at Montgomery on the 1st of September, having encountered 
no opposition. There was nothing there to oppose it. Gen- 
eral Carter's cavalry division moved thence in three columns, 
one under General Shackelford on Loudon Bridge, one under 
Colonel Byrd on Kingston, and one under Colonel Foster on 
Knoxville. 

Major-General Buckner, in command of the Department of 
East Tennessee, had, in obedience to orders from the Confed- 
erate War Department, gathered up all his available force, 
with the exception of two thousand men under command of 
Brigadier General John B. Frazer, who was left in defense 
of Cumberland Gap, and a few isolated detachments at 
Knoxville and other places under command of Brigadier 
General Jackson, and formed a junction Avith Bragg's army 
at Chattanooga. Previous to leaving Knoxville, General 
Buckner wrote Major General Sam Jones, in command of 
the Department of West Virginia, requesting him to look 
after his department during his absence. Jones's head- 
quarters were at Dublin, Va. He had his hands full taking 
care of Generals Averill and Scammon, who had on several 
occasions pushed their commands across the mountains from 
the north and the Kanawha Valley, and he was unable with 
troops at his command to do much besides look after his own 
department. In compliance with Buckner's request, how- 
ever, he came down the road as far as Abingdon, when, on 
the 6th of September, he wrote General Frazer directing him 
to hold Cumberland Gap as long as possible, as re-enforce- 
ments were then on the way from the East. The long line 
extending from Staunton, Va., to the Salt-works, over two 
hundred miles, comprised in the Department of Western 
Virginia, rendered it out of the power of General Jones to 
re-enforce him with his own troops. 

In compliance with his request. General Lee returned to 
him one of his own brigades, commanded by Brigadier Gen- 
eral Wharton, which had been for several months on duty in 
the Army of Northern Virginia, and later another under 
command of Brigadier General Corse. General Jones's mes- 
senger reached General Frazer too late to prevent his sur- 
render, and two thousand men were thus subtracted from the 
little force left to oppose the occupation of East Tennessee 
by the troops under General Burnside. 

The following extract from the returns of the army of 
Western Virginia and East Tennessee will show the troops 
actually on duty in East Tennessee from the 16th of Septem- 
ber, at which date the brigade last mentioned arrived: 



10 

INFANTRY BRIGADES. 

Brigadier General Corse (sent by General Lee) — Fifteenth, 
Twenty-ninth, and Thirtieth Virginia. 

Brigadier General Jackson (Buckner's corps) — Thomas's 
legion, Walker's battalion. 

Brigadier General Wharton (at Salt-works) — Fifty-first 
Virginia, Thirtieth Virginia battalion, Forty-fifth Virginia. 

CAVALRY BRIGADES. 

Brigadier General W. E. Jones (made up from fragment- 
ary commands) — Twenty-first Virginia Cavalry, Twenty- 
seventh, Thirty- fourth. Thirty-sixth, and Thirty-seventh 
Virginia Cavalry Battalions. 

Brigadier General John S. Williams (one-half of them 
mounted) — Sixth-fourth Virginia Detached Cavalry, First 
Tennessee Cavalry, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, May's Ken- 
tucky Cavalry Battalion, Tenth Kentucky Cavalry Batta- 
lion, Sixteenth Georgia Cavalry Battalion. 

ARTILLERY. 

J. Floyd King — Otey's Battery, Lowry's Battery, Ring- 
gold's Battery, Davidson's Battery. 

The efiective total of the above command was, up to the 
ICth of September, about 4,000. Corse's brigade increased 
it to 5,180, and Wharton's brigade, 1,852 strong, was sta- 
tioned at the Salt-works. 

The force with which General Burnside confronted that of 
General Jones, above mentioned, was as follows. 

Present for duty (equipped) — 

TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS, 

Infantry 6,559 

Mounted Infantry .3,123 

Cavalry 3,436 

Artillery 1,341 

14,459 

* NINTH ARMY CORPS. 

Infantrv 6,222 

Artillery Ill 

Total 20,792 

The cavalry expeditions from Montgomery were all suc- 
cessful. Kingston and Knoxville were taken without op- 
position, but at Loudon Bridge Buckner's rear guard was 
strongly posted. Alter a brisk skirmish they were driven 
back by Shackelford's command. The railroad bridge over 



11 

the Holston, a fine structure, had been saturated with tur- 
pentine, and the guard no sooner retreated across it than it 
was committed to the flames. Colonel Byrd captured at 
Kingston a steamboat in process of construction, and com- 
municated with Colonel's Minty's pickets of General Rose- 
<;rans's army. 

Leaving Byrd's brigade at Loudon, and White's division 
at Athens, General Burnside pushed the remainder of the 
Twenty-third Corps on to Knoxville. Buckner had left 
Knoxville, the day before Colonel Foster's arrival, leaving 
behind him a small force to guard a considerable quantity of 
quartermaster's stores, the Government work-shops and a 
large quantity of salt, whicli fell into Foster's hands. Gen- 
eral Burnside reached the city on the 3d. 

Major Genfral Sam Jones, in command of the department 
of West Virginia, was directed by the Confederate War De- 
partment to extend a protectorate over the district of East 
Tennessee. 

Arriving upon the scene of operations too late to prevent 
the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland Gap, he turned his 
attention to the formation of a command which should pre- 
vent the advance of Burnside' s troops eastward, while by 
a show of force he should be able to hold his antagonist from 
participation in the straggle then impending near Chat- 
tanooga. 

The value of the salt-works at Saltville, fourteen miles 
east of Abingdon, was inestimable to the Southern army. 
Their destruction would inflict an irreparable loss upon the 
Confederacy. Although the capture and destruction of those 
works seemed never to have entered the calculations of Gen- 
eral Burnside or the War Department, the head of General 
Burnside's column had no sooner turned in that direction 
from Cumberland Gap than General Jones at once conject- 
ured the objective point to be the precious salt-works, which 
it had been his especial duty to guard. 

On the 14th the Union troops were reported to be moving 
from Cumberland Gap on the Salt-works. General Whar- 
ton was placed in command of the defenses and Otey's bat- 
tery ordered to report to him. Majors Chenoweth and 
Prentice were ordered to send out scouts and ascertain the 
truth of the report. Colonel J. E. Carter, in command of 
the First Tennessee Cavalry Brigade, was directed to move 
via Reedy Creek and Moccasin Gap, and " if the enemy 
moves toward Saltville, get in his rear and harass him." It 
will be observed that the mind of General Jones had become 
impressed with two ideas, both of which were erroneous. 



12 

One, that General Burnside had hut a portion of his force in 
East Tennessee, having sent the greater portion of his troops 
to co-operate with Rosecrans below Chattanooga ; the other, 
that General Burnside had designs upon the Salt-works. 
Both ideas were precisely those which would naturally occur 
to the mind of an intelligent antagonist, conversant with the 
importance of both movements, and that he was wrong in 
his surmises reflects less credit upon his antagonist than 
upon himself. 

General Lee, whose mind embraced in its comprehensive 
grasp the operations of the Confederate army throughout the 
whole arena of war, and having little occupation along his 
front, had already responded to the call of General Bragg for 
re-enforcements by detaching one of his strongest corps, under 
Longstreet, for service at Chattanooga, and now finding the 
salt-works upon which his army depended threatened, he had 
promptly supplied to General Jones an additional brigade 
under command of Brigadier-General Corse. Wharton's 
brigade was encamped at Glade Springs, within supporting 
distance of the artillery in defense of the salt-works. Corse 
was brought to the front and preparations made to defend the 
line of road leading into the valley of the Upper Tennessee, 
and if possible prevent Burnside from advancing upon the 
salt-works and also from detaching any considerable portion 
of his force to re-eniorce Rosecrans. 

In response to a telegram from President Davis, asking 
the strength and position of his forces, General Jones replied 
as follows : 

"JoNESBORO, September 15, 1863. 
^ ^ His Excellency Jefferson Davis , Richmond, Va. : 

"^Your telegram of yesterday received last night. I shall 
withdraw the troops from this to the Watauga and Holston 
to await the re-enforcements and be in better position to meet 
an advance on Saltville. No reliable information of the 
movements of the enemy from Cumberland Gap. Pickets 
skirmishing in front everyday; our pickets behaving well. 

"Sam Jones, Major-General." 

General Jones says in his report: 

"Under all the circumstances of the case I thought the 
best service I could render with the small force under my 
command would be to check and detain the superior force in 
my front until the battle which I supposed was impending 
near Chattanooga should be decided." 

The following telegrams were sent by Rosecrans to Hal- 
leck : 



13 

"Trenton, Ga,, September 7 — Midnight, 
" Tour dispatch yesterday received with surprise. Yoii 
have been often and fully advised that the nature of the coun- 
try makes it impossible for this array to prevent Johnston 
from combining with Bragg. When orders for an advance 
of this army were made it must have been known that those 
two rebel forces would combine against it, and to some ex- 
tent choose their place for fighting us. This has doubtless- 
been done, and Buckner, Johnston, and Bragg are all near 
Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was inde- 
pendent of mine. Your apprehensions are just and the legit- 
imate consequences of your orders. The best that can now 
be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left^ 
supporting it with his infantry." 

" Chattanooga, 12.15 P. M., September 12. 
" I think it would be very unwise for General Burnside, in 
present attitude of affairs, to make any move in the direction 
of North Carolina. It would leave my left flank entirely un- 
protected all the way into Kentucky. All forces should be- 
concentrated in this direction. I trust I am sufficient for the 
enemy now in my front, but should he fall back to the line 
of the Coosa the roads from there are short and compara- 
tively good to the Tennessee, while it is necessary for me to- 
cross two ranges of mountains over very narrow, rough, and 
difiicult roads to reach Tennessee, and thence move from thirty 
to fifty miles to reach the flankof a column moving from Gun- 
ter's Landing, or Whitesburg, on Nashville. It is desirable 
to have the avenue shut up. Can not you send a force from 
the army to do it? '' 

On the 9th of September Burnside telegraphed Halleck 
from Knoxville : 

" My forces in East Tennessee are now distributed as fol- 
lows : A division of infantry at Loudon, with a mounted 
brigade in the direction of Athens." * * * 

And on the 17th: 

" In my last dispatch I told you of a force I have at Lou- 
don and Athens, the advance connecting with Rosecrans. It 
will be left as it was there, and the remainder of our force 
concentrated at Greenville." 

The General of the Army appears to have been equally un- 
successful in procuring re-enforcements from the Army of the 
Tennessee, which had been for two months resting upon the 
laurels of Vicksburg, while their paroled prisoners were 
flocking to the standard of Bragg. 



14 

He received the following dispatch from Rosecrans, dated 
Chattanooga, September 12, 1863: 

" Hurl but dispatches that the- country south of Corinth is 
full of irregular cavalry. He is induced to believe that a 
general movement of all the available force of the enemy is 
bein i made on this army. Hurlbut ought to cover that flank. 
It is reported from several sources that even Loring's divis- 
ion has been moved up and is at Atlanta. 

" Burnside ought to send his infantry down in this direc- 
tion. The enemy has concentrated at Lafayette, and has at- 
tacked one of Thomas's columns in the Chickamauga valley, 
wext of Dug Gap, compelling it to fall back to Stevens's 
Oap." 

And on the 13th he telegraphed: 

■"7b Generals Grant or Sherman, Vick'^burg : 

"It is quite possible that Bragg and Johnston will move 
through Alabama and Tennessee to turn Rosecrans's right 
and cut off communication. All of G-rant's available forces 
should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tuscum- 
bia, to co-operate with Rosecrans should the rebels attempt 
that movement." 

The same dispatch was sent to Hurlbut, at Memphis, and 
again September 14: 

" There are good reasons why troops should be sent to 
'assist Rosecrans's right with all possible dispatch. Commu- 
nicate with Sherman to assist you and hurry forward re- 
en fbrceraents as previously directed." 

On the 9th of September General Burnside reported the 
capture of Cumberland Gap and two thousand prisoners and 
the occupation of East Tennessee from Jonesboro on the 
northeast to Athens in the southwest. To this report Gen- 
eral Halleck lesponded on the 11th, congratulating him upon 
his success, directing him to hold the gaps in the North Car- 
olina mountains, and to connect with General Rosecrans, at 
least with his cavalry, notifying hira that the latter would 
occupy Dalton or some point on the railroad, to close all ac- 
cess from Atlanta. On the 13th Halleck telegraphed Burn- 
side as follows : 

" It is important that all the available forces of your com- 
mand be pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scat- 
tered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we 
hold Tennessee, Kentucky is perfectly safe. 3Iove down your 
infantry as rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga to connect 
ivith Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes in the 
mountains to cover Atlanta, and move his main array through 



15 

"Northern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River and turn 
Rosecrans's right, cutting off his supplies. In that case he 
will turn Chattanooga over to you and move to intercept 
Bragg." 

Here is a positive order, as explicit as any given to Rose- 
crans, for Burnside to move his infantry down t6ward Chat- 
tanooga to connect with Rosecrans. The same order liad 
been given on the 5th of August and had formed a part of 
the plan of expedition. It was reiterated on the 5th of 
September_, when he was directed to keep Rosecrans informed 
of his movements and arrange with him for co-operation. 
On September 11, when he was notified of Rosecrans's posi- 
tion and need of re-enfbrcements, and again on the 13th, as 
seen in the above dispatch, he had in Tennessee a division of 
cavalry and mounted infantry whose efiective strength, as 
shown by the field returns of September 20, was : '' Present 
for duty, equipped, 6,700, with thirty-four pieces of artillery." 
His infantry and artillery under Hartsuff numbered : "Pres- 
ent for duty, equipped, 6,586, with thirty-two pieces of 
artillery." One has but to imagine the grand results of the 
Chattanooga campaign if these orders had been obeyed. 

Burnside entered Knoxville with an army often thousand 
men on the 6th of September, leaving a division of infantry 
and a brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry at Loudon 
and Athens. He found supplies abundant, besides which he 
had crossed the mountains with two thousand beef cattle. 
His advance, under Foster, captured at Knoxville five loco- 
motives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity of provis- 
ions. After capturing the force and subsistence stores at 
Cumberland Gap and opening the route to and from Ken- 
tucky, and arming the East Tennesseeans with five thousand 
stand of arms brought with him for that purpose, he had 
ample time and opportunity in which to have dispatched at 
least ten thousand troops to report for duty to General Rose- 
crans, On the 18th he acknowledged the receipt of Halleck's 
dispatch of the 13th, above quoted, and also of one dated on 
the. 14th, which read as follows : " There are reasons why 
you should re-enforce General Rosecrans with all possible dis- 
patcli. It is believed the enemy will concentrate to give 
him battle. You must be there to help him." To this ur- 
gent appeal he replied on the 18th from Knoxville : "Orders 
to go below will be obeyed as soon as possible. I go to 
Greenville to-night (in the opposite direction). Dispositions 
for attacking the enemy at Jonesboro' made. I will lose no 
time in doing as you order. No direct telegraphic communi- 
cation as yet. Hope to get it to-morrow." 

The next .day, while Rosecrans, after the brilliant flank 
movement which compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga, 



16 



found his army on the eve of a terrible battle, Burnside tele- 
graphed from Greenville: "Will obey your directions \n 
reference to Rosecrans. Our troops occupy Jonesboro'. Ene- 
my retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry in pursuit. Am 
now sending every man that can be spared to aid Rosecrans. 
I shall go on to Joneshoro\ As soon as I learn the result of 
our movements to the east will go down by railroad and direct 
the movements of re-enforcements for Rosecrans. I have di- 
rected every available man in Kentucky to be sent here." 

On the 20th he received a dispatch irom Halleck stating 
that General Meade did not believe that any of E well's 
troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared ; that Long- 
street, Johnston, and Bragg had concentrated against Rose- 
crans, who was on the Chickaraauga River^ twenty miles 
south of Chattanooga, closing thus : "He is expecting a bat- 
tle and wants you to sustain his left. Every possible effort 
must be made to assist him." To this Burnside replied from 
Knoxville on the 20th: "You may be sure I will do all I 
can for Rosecrans. Arrived here last night and am hurrying 
troops in his direction. I go up the road to-night for a day."^ 

The following dispatch received by Rosecrans on the bat- 
tlefield on the 19th, and that which follows on the 20th, 
shows that Halleck fully expected a junction of the two ar- 
mies : "I have no direct communication with Burnside or 
Hurlbut. On the 15th Hurlbut says he is movinsf towant 
Decatur. I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from 
Vicksburg. A telegram from Burnside on the 17th, just re- 
ceived, says my orders to move down to re-enforce you will be 
obeyed as soon as possible. * * * Burnside's cavalry 
ought to be near you by this time." That on the 20th is as 
follows: "General Burnside's instructions before he lel't 
Kentucky were to connect with your left. These instructions 
have been repeated five or six times, and he has answered 
that he was moving with that object. I think his advance 
cannot be far from you." On the 21st: "Nothing heard 
from Burnside since the 19th. He was then sending to your 
aid all his available force. It is hoped that you will hold 
out until he reaches you. He was directed to connect witl» 
you ten days ago. lean get no reply from Hurlbut or Sherman . " 

So the correspondence went on from day to day, and not a 
man was sent to Rosecrans. The battle of Chickamaug.u 
was fought on the 19th and 20th. The noble Army of the 
Cumberland, struggling against terrible odds, held its posi- 
tion even after the fatal blunder, as shown by General Boyn- 
ton, which opened its lines and admitted Longstreet's vic- 
torious legions upon its flanks. Obedience to the positive 
order of General Halleck would have brought^the infantry 
of the Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample time to 



17 

retrieve the disaster, if not to have prevented it. The force 
that required only a small portion of Burnside's troops to 
<lrive back from Knoxville to Jonesboro', and which virtually 
prevented the co-operation of Burnside with Rosecrans, has 
been already stated. This is how Burnside states it in his 
dispatch to Halleck of the 21st of September: "Before I 
knew of the necessity of sending immediate assistance to Gen- 
■eral Rosecrans I had sent a considerable portion of my force 
to capture and drive out a large force of the enemy under 
Oeneral Sam Jones, stationed on the road from Bristol to 
Jonesboro, which amounts to six thousand men." 

The student of these campaigns cannot fail to be impressed 
with the folly of the War Department in attempting to direct 
the management of two separate armies, operating upon par- 
allel lines eastward from their respective bases, by telegraph, 
from a point a thousand miles distant, without giving to one 
commander extraordinary powers in case of emergency. The 
misfortune that attended the Army of the Cumberland could 
have been arrested if Burnside had remained in Cincinnati, 
^sending Hartsuff into East Tennessee. Burnside's commis- 
sion ante-dated that of Rosecrans as major-general three days, 
and for this reason the latter could not order the Army of the 
Ohio to his assistance. General Burnside told Hartsuff that 
lie could not go to Chattanooga, as he ranked Rosecrans, and 
<'onfusion might arise. To which Hartsuff replied: "Let me 
g(y, I don't rank him." 

General Burnside, however, explains his action in the same 
report, as follows : 

•' It should be remembered that up to the night of the 16th 
I was acting under instructions to occupy the upper country 
■of East Tennessee, and all of my available forces were well 
up the valley above Knoxville. All that could be turned 
hack were started at once, and as soon as possible the re- 
mainder were withdrawn from the presence of the enemy and 
turned back for the purpose of proceeding to the relief of Gen- 
<Mal Rosecrans. 

" The point where the troops were turned back on the ITth 
was 140 miles from Chickamauga, where General Rosecrans 
Avas fighting on the l^th, and the advance of our forces was 
over two hundred miles distant therefrom. It will be readilv 
seen that under no circumstances could we have reached even 
the neighborhood of General Rosecrans's forces during that 
battle. The troops were moved in that direction as rapi<lly 
as possible. Many dispatches passed between General Hal- 
ieck and myself after this in reference to going to Rosecrans' 
assistance after he had established himself at Chattanooga, 
and some misunderstandings occurred in regard to the pur- 
port of these dispatches. I was averse to doing what would 



18 



in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee, and he waf? 
anxious lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold Chatta- 
nooga, and we held our ground in East Tennessee, so that 
what occurred in no way affected the result." 

Halleck was kept fully advised of the movements of Rose- 
crans. The perilous position of his unprotected flanks was 
pointed out while pushing his army vigorously forward to- 
ward the enemy. The following dispatches announced the 
results of both days' fighting, and are the only dispatches 
sent by Rosecrans during the battle, or from September 1 8 to 22 : 
"Crawfish Springs, September 18, 1863. 

"Everything indicates that the enemy is determined to 
make every effort to overthrow this army. What we most 
need is to have our flanks well covered. You do not say how 
soon Hurlbut is to move. Please advise me what orders he 
has received, and from whence he is to draw subsistence. 

" Even a movement in Tuscumbia Valley would be of great 
importance at this time. 

' ' Enemy demonstrating on our front now. We occupy line 
of West Chickamauga. 

" Our cavalry on right covers Stevens's Gap." 

" Chickamauga, September 19, 1863. 

" We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting, and have 
another in prospect for to-morrow. The enemy attempted to 
turn our left, but his design was anticipated, and a sufficient 
force placed there to render his design abortive. The battle- 
ground was densely wooded and its surface irregular and 
difficult. We could make but little use of our artillery. 
The number of our killed is inconsiderable ; that of ojir 
wounded very heavy. The enemy is greatly our superior in 
numbers. Among our prisoners are members of some thirty 
rejiiments. We have taken ten cannon and lost seven. The 
army is in excellent condition and spirits, and by the bless- 
ing of Providence the defeat of the enemy will be total to- 
morrow." 

Chattanooga, September 20, 1863—5 P. M. 

"We have met with a serious disaster ; enemy overwhelmed 
us, drove our right, pierced our center, and scattered troop& 
there. Thomas, who had seven divisions, remained intact 
at last news. Granger, with two brigades, had gone to sup- 
port Thomas on the left. Every available reserve was used 
when the men were stampeded. Burnside will be notified of 
the state of things at once and you will be informed. Troops 
from Charleston, Florida, Virginia, and all along the sea- 
board are among the prisoners. It seems that every available 
man was thrown against us." 



V.) 

'' Chattanooga, September 22, 180:-^. 
" We have fought a most sanguinary hattlc against va-tly 
superior nurahers. Longstreet is here and probably Ewell^ 
and a force is coming from Charleston. We have snfTcred 
terribly, but have inflicted equal injury upon the enemy. 
The mass of this army is intact and in good spirits. Disas- 
ter not as great as I anticipated. We held our position 
in the main up to Sunday night. Retired on Rossville, 
which we held yesterday, then retired on Chattanooga. Our 
position is a good one. Think we can hold ont several days, 
and, if re-enforcements come up soon, everything will come 
out all right. Our transportation is mainly across tho river. 
Have one bridge, another will be done to-day. Our cavalry 
will be concentrated on the west side of the river to guard it 
on our left. Will be compelled to abandon south side of 
river below this point." 

LINCOLN TO EOSECRANS. 

" Washington, September 21, 1863. 
" General Rosecrans, Chattanooga : 

" Be of good cheer. We have unabated confidence in you 
and your soldiers and officers. In the main you must be the 
judge of what is to be done. If I were to suggest I would 
say save your army by taking strong positions until Burn- 
side joins you, when I hope you can turn the tide. I think 
you had better send a courier to Burnside to hurry him up ; 
we cannot reach him by telegraph. We suppose some force 
is going your way by Corinth, but for want of communica- 
tion we do not know how they are getting along. We shall 
do all we can to assist you. A. Lincoln." 

LINCOLN AND BURNSIDE. 

Washington, D. C, September 21, 1863. 
General Burnside, Knoxville, Tenn.: 

Go to Rosecrans with your force without a moment's de- 
lay. A. Lincoln. 

What influences were afterwards brought to bear ujion the 
mind of the President to induce him to consent to the re- 
moval of General Rosecrans from the command of the army 
that he had thrice led to victory will never be known. The 
conspirators are dead, and the malice, jealousy, -and political 
animosity of the time have passed away, buried, let us hope, 
with the sectional hatred that gave rise to these events 

Having advanced in obedience to peremptory orders, as 
shown by General Boynton, with no corresptmding orders 
for the support of his flanks, ivosecrans was permitted to 
cross a navigable river and two mountain ranges and fight a- 
battle beyond the reach of succor in case of disaster. 



20 

It has been shown that when the result of this reckless 
folly dawned upon the mind of General Halleck he made 
liaste to repair his error by ordering support from the armies 
on the right and left. 

It is equally plain that the commanders of both armies felt 
themselves sure of immunity from censure from the War 
Department by disobedience of the orders of the General of 
the Army. 

A corps commander had been dismissed the army for a 
similar offense. 

Regarding the two campaigns as one in their objects, and 
"the two armies as but the right and left wings of a grand 
army of invasion of Confederate territory moving on par- 
allel lines, under a common commander, it is reasonable to 
suppose that re-enforcements from right to left would have 
been made as occasion demanded. The Confederates re- 
garded the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland as of 
]iaramount importance, and boldly massed an army in its 
front of sufHcient magnitude, in their opinion, to accomplish 
that object. The temporary evacuation of Chattanooga 
southward was rendered necessary by the strategical move 
ment of a large portion of General Rosecrans's army upon 
Bragg's communications, but the feeling in the Confederate 
army was an unwavering faith in their success. This feel- 
ing was shared by the people at large. Hundreds of families 
who had left their homes in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, 
and kept in the rear of the Confederate army in its retro- 
grade movement, were congregated at Rome, Georgia. 

They had led a nomadic life, moving from Murfreesboro' 
to Winchester, thence to Chattanooga and Rome, and in- 
si)ired with a hope of returning to their homes as a result of 
the defeat and pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, they 
had their goods and baggage packed in wagons ready to fol- 
low the victorious flag of the Confederacy northward to the 
Cumberland. The fancy of many took a wilder flight. 

Knowing that Rosecrans's army alone stood between the 
powerful host of veteran troops concentrating at Layfayette 
and the Ohio River, it was not too much to hope that a vig- 
orous pursuit of a disorganized army, demoralized by defeat, 
would carry -the war into the Northern States. 

That they were disappointed in their expeditions was due 
not less to the pluck and endurance of the magnificent Army 
of the Cumberland than to the brilliant combination of cour 
age and zeal of its commander, who manoeuvered Bragg 
€ut of his stronghold and fought him in the o])en field. 

G. C. KNIFFIN, 

Lt.-Col. Staff, A. C. 



